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1 Introduction
During the last decades a lot of coalition formation models have been proposed
and investigated; see e.g., van Deemen [7] or de Vries [15] for an overview. In the
present paper we focus on the model, recently introduced in Rusinowska et al.
[12]. In this model, the notion of a feasible stable government is central. Roughly
speaking, a feasible government is a pair consisting of a majority coalition of par-
ties and a policy supported by this coalition. Stability of a feasible government
means that it is not dominated by another feasible one. However, determining
feasible stable governments can become quite complex and requires a lot of com-
putations. This holds, in particular, if one is interested in all such governments,
for example, in order to choose one of them by means of a bargaining procedure.
Hence, using a computer program to calculate which governments are feasible
and stable, would be extremely useful for real life applications of the model.
Since some decades relational algebra is used successfully for formal problem
speciﬁcation, prototyping, and algorithm development. See e.g., Schmidt et al.
  Co-operation for this paper was supported by European COST Action 274 “Theory
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[13], Brink et al. [6], de Swart el al. [14]. Relations are well suited for modeling
and reasoning about many discrete structures (like graphs, games, Petri nets,
lattices) and, due to the easy mechanization (using, for instance, Boolean matri-
ces) also for computations on them. Feasibility of a government can be described
by two relations which state whether a party accepts a coalition and whether
a party supports a policy. The same holds for stability. It can be deﬁned in
terms of the ‘is-part-of’ relations between parties and governments, the domi-
nance relation on governments, and a list of relations comparing governments
with respect to the utility of parties. Hence, relational algebra seems to be very
promising for computer-aided investigations of coalition formation.
The purpose of this paper is to prove this point. We combine relational alge-
bra and RelView, a tool for the visualization and manipulation of relations and
for prototyping and relational programming, to compute the set of all feasible
stable governments in the sense of Rusinowska et al. [12]. To illustrate the power
of the approach, we solve an example based on the real structure of the Polish
government after the 2001 elections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our
mathematical model of coalition formation. In Section 3 we collect the facts on
relations which are necessary to treat coalition formation relation-algebraically.
The treatment itself is done in Section 4 and essentially consists of the speciﬁ-
cation of the decisive notions of feasibility, dominance, and stability for govern-
ments by relation-algebraic expressions. In Section 5 we show how to translate
the speciﬁcations of Section 4 into RelView code and solve the Polish govern-
ment example. Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 The Mathematical Model of Coalition Formation
In this section, we brieﬂy recall some of the main ideas of the model of coalition
formation presented in Rusinowska et al. [12], i.e., the notions essential for the
application of relational algebra and RelView to the model. Let N be the set
of political parties, and P be the set of all policies. A set of parties, i.e., an
element of the powerset 2N, is called a coalition. We deﬁne a government as a
pair consisting of a coalition and a policy. Hence,
G := {(S,p) | S   2N   p   P }
denotes the set of all governments. Usually, we assume that only a majority
coalition (i.e., a coalition with more than half of the total number of seats in
Parliament) can form a government. Nevertheless, one may easily imagine a
government formed by a minority coalition.
Each party is assumed to have preferences on all policies and on all coalitions.
A coalition is called feasible if it is acceptable to all its members. A policy is
feasible for a given coalition if it is acceptable to all members of that coalition.
A government is said to be feasible if it consists of a feasible coalition and a policy
feasible for that coalition. By G  we denote the set of all feasible governments:
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For each i   N, we assume a utility function U(i) : G   R, where U(i)(g)
denotes the utility (value) of government g   G to party i   N. A precise
deﬁnition of the utility of a government to a party has been given in Rusinowska
et al. [12]. In Roubens et al. [10], the MacBeth technique has been applied to
determine these utilities.
A feasible government g =( S,p)   G  dominates a feasible government
h   G  (denoted as g   h) if the property
( i   S : U(i)(g)   U(i)(h))   ( i   S : U(i)(g) >U (i)(h)) (1)
holds. A feasible government is said to be stable if it is dominated by no feasible
government. By
SG  := {g   G  | ¬ h   G  : h   g}
we denote the set of all (feasible) stable governments.
3 Relational Preliminaries
In this section, we ﬁrst recall the basics of relational algebra. Next, we introduce
some further relational constructions which are used in the remainder of the
paper. For more details on relations and relational algebra, see e.g., Schmidt et
al. [13] or Brink et al. [6].
3.1 Relational Algebra
If X and Y are sets, then a subset R of the Cartesian product X   Y is called
a (binary) relation with domain X and range Y . We denote the set (in this
context also called type) of all relations with domain X and range Y by [X  Y ]
and write R : X  Y instead of R   [X  Y ]. If X and Y are ﬁnite sets of
size m and n respectively, then we may consider a relation R : X  Y as a
Boolean matrix with m rows and n columns. The Boolean matrix interpretation
of relations is well suited for many purposes and also used as one of the graphical
representations of relations within the RelView tool. Therefore, in this paper
we often use Boolean matrix terminology and notation. In particular, we write
Rx,y instead of  x,y  R.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic operations on relations,
viz. RT (transposition), R (complement), R   S (union), R   S (intersection),
R;S (composition), R  (reﬂexive-transitive closure), and the special relations O
(empty relation), L (universal relation), and I (identity relation). If R is included
in S we write R   S and equality of R and S is denoted as R = S.
3.2 Modeling of Sets
Relational algebra o ers some simple and elegant ways to describe subsets of a
given set or, equivalently, predicates on this set. In this paper we will use vectors
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A vector v is a relation v with v = v;L. For v being of type [X  Y ] this
condition means: Whatever set Z and universal relation L : Y  Z we choose,
an element x   X is either in relationship (v;L)x,z to no element z   Z or to all
elements z   Z. As for a vector, therefore, the range is irrelevant, we consider in
the following mostly vectors v : X  1 with a speciﬁc singleton set 1 := { } as
range and omit in such cases the second subscript, i.e., write vx instead of vx, .
Analogously to linear algebra we will use lower-case letters to denote vectors.
A vector v : X  1 can be considered as a Boolean matrix with exactly one
column, i.e., as a Boolean column vector, and describes (or: is a description of)
the subset {x   X | vx} of X.
As a second way to model sets we will use the relation-level equivalents of the
set-theoretic symbol “ ”, i.e., membership-relations   : X  2X. These speciﬁc
relations are deﬁned by  x,Y if and only if x   Y , for all x   X and Y   2X.
A Boolean matrix representation of   requires exponential space. However, in
Berghammer et al. [4] an implementation of   using reduced ordered binary
decision diagrams (ROBDDs) is presented, the number of vertices of which is
linear in the size of X.
3.3 Cartesian Products and Disjoint Unions
Given a Cartesian product X  Y of two sets X and Y , there are two projection
functions which decompose a pair u =  u1,u 2  into its ﬁrst component u1 and its
second component u2. For a relation-algebraic approach it is useful to consider
instead of these functions the corresponding projection relations   : X Y  X
and   : X Y  Y such that for all u   X  Y , x   X, and y   Y we have  u,x if
and only if u1 = x and  u,y if and only if u2 = y. Projection relations enable us to
describe the well-known pairing operation of functional programming relation-
algebraically as follows: For relations R : Z  X and S : Z  Y we deﬁne their
pairing (frequently also called fork or tupling)[ R,S]:Z  X Y by
[R,S] := R; T   S; T. (2)
Using (2), for all z   Z and u   X   Y a simple reﬂection shows that [R,S]z,u
if and only if Rz,u1 and Sz,u2. As a consequence, the exchange relation
E := [ , ]= ; T    ; T (3)
of type [X Y  X Y ] exchanges the components of a pair. This means that for
all u,v   X   Y the relationship Eu,v holds if and only if u1 = v2 and u2 = v1.
Analogously to the product the disjoint union X+Y := (X {1})   (Y  {2})
of two sets X and Y leads to the two injection relations ı : X  X+Y and
  : Y  X+Y such that for all u   X + Y , x   X, and y   Y we have ıx,u if
and only if u =  x,1  and  y,u if and only if u =  y,2 . In this case the counter-
part of pairing is the sum R + S : X+Y  Z of two relations R : X  Z and
S : Y  Z, deﬁned by
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From speciﬁcation (4) we obtain for all u   X + Y and z   Z that (R + S)u,z
if and only if there exists x   X such that u =  x,1  and Rx,z or there exists
y   Y such that u =  y,2  and Sy,z.
We end this section with an application of the constructions introduced so
far, which is used in the remainder of the paper. Our starting point is the repre-
sentation of a relation R : X  Y by a vector vec(R):X Y  1, which means
that for all x   X and y   Y the properties Rx,y and vec(R) x,y , , or vec(R) x,y 
for short, are equivalent. To obtain a relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of vec(R),
i.e., an expression which does not use element relationships (in our notation: does
not use indices) but only the constants and operations of relational algebra, we
assume x   X and y   Y and calculate as follows:
Rx,y     a :   x,y ,a   Ra,y   : X Y  X projection
   ( ;R) x,y ,y
    b :(  ;R) x,y ,b     x,y ,b   : X Y  Y projection
    b :(  ;R    ) x,y ,b   Lb L : Y  1
   (( ;R    );L) x,y  .
An immediate consequence of the last expression of this calculation and the
equality of relations is the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation
vec(R) = ( ;R    );L (5)
of the vector vec(R):X Y  1 (see also Schmidt et al. [13]). Finally, we consider
a list R(1),R (2),...,R(n) of relations R(i) : X  Y . Let N := {1,...,n}. If we
identify this set with the disjoint union of n copies of 1, then
C := vec(R(1))
T
+ ... + vec(R(n))
T
(6)
deﬁnes a relation of type [N  X Y ] such that, using Boolean matrix terminol-
ogy, for all i   N the ith row of C equals the transpose of the vector vec(R(i)).
Hence, from the above considerations we obtain for all i   N,x   X, and y   Y
the equivalence of Ci, x,y  and R
(i)
x,y.
4 Relational Description of Coalition Formation
Based on the mathematical model of coalition formation in Section 2, in this
section we develop relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of feasible governments, the
dominance relationship, and stable governments. As we will demonstrate in Sec-
tion 5, these can be translated immediately into the programming language of
the RelView tool and then applied to deal with concrete examples.
4.1 Feasibility
In order to develop a relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of feasible governments, we
need two ‘acceptability’ relations A and B. We assume A : N  P such that








































96 Relations, RelView and Coalition Formation
for all i   N and p   P, and B : N  2N such that
Bi,S    party i accepts coalition S
for all i   N and S   2N.
Based on the two acceptability relations A and B and the description of
feasibility given in Section 2, next we consider the following three relations:
1. A relation isFea(A):2 N  P such that a coalition S   2N and a policy
p   P are in relationship isFea(A)S,p if and only if p is feasible for S.A
formal predicate logic deﬁnition of this is
isFea(A)S,p     i : i   S   Ai,p . (7)
2. A vector feaC(B):2 N  1 which describes the set of all feasible coalitions.
Here we have for all S   2N the predicate logic deﬁnition
feaC(B)S     i : i   S   Bi,S . (8)
3. A relation feaG(A,B) : 2N  P which coincides with the set G  of feasible
governments. Using the relations introduced so far, hence we have for all
coalitions S   2N and policies p   P the description
feaG(A,B)S,p    isFea(A)S,p   feaC(B)S . (9)
Our goal is to obtain from the predicate logic deﬁnitions (7), (8), and (9) of
the relations isFea(A), feaC(B), and feaG(A,B) equivalent relation-algebraic
speciﬁcations. The proof of the following theorem shows how to calculate these.
Besides the predicate logic deﬁnitions and some simple logical laws it only uses
well-known correspondences between certain logical constructions and relation-
algebraic operations (see e.g., Schmidt et al. [13]).
Theorem 4.1 Assume   : N  2N to be the membership-relation on the set of
parties. Then we have
isFea(A)= T;A, (10)
feaC(B)=(    B)
T
;L, (11)
feaG(A,B)= T;A   (    B)
T
;L;L. (12)
Proof: For all S   2N and p   P we are able to calculate
isFea(A)S,p     i : i   S   Ai,p (7)
   ¬ i : i   S   Ai,p
   ¬ i :  T
S,i   Ai,p








































9Relations, RelView and Coalition Formation 7
and from the last expression of this derivation we get (10) due to the deﬁnition
of equality of relations. In the same way (11) follows from
feaC(B)S     i : i   S   Bi,S (8)
   ¬ i : i   S   Bi,S
   ¬ i :  i,S   Bi,S
   ¬ i :(     B)i,S
   ¬ i :(     B)
T
S,i   Li L : P  1
   ((    B)
T
;L)S
for all S   2N and the equality of relations, and (12) follows from
feaG(A,B)S,p    isFea(A)S,p   feaC(B)S (9)
   isFea(A)S,p   ( i : feaC(B)S,i   Li,p) L : N  P
   isFea(A)S,p   (feaC(B);L)S,p
   (isFea(A)   feaC(B);L)S,p
   ( T;A   (    B)
T
;L;L)S,p (10),(11)
for all S   2N and p   P and the equality of relations.  
It should be remarked that the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of feaG(A,B)
uses two di erent universal relations, which are denoted with the same symbol
L. The inner L of (12) has type [P  1], i.e., is a universal vector, whereas the
type of the outer L of (12) is [N  P], i.e., this L is a ‘proper’ universal relation.
4.2 Dominance
Now, we consider the set G  of all feasible governments and want to develop
a relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of the dominance relationship between feasible
governments. To this end, we suppose a relational description of government
membership to be given, that is, a relation M : N  G  such that
Mi,g    party i is a member of government g
for all i   N and g   G . Moreover, for each party i   N, we introduce a utility
(or comparison) relation R(i) : G   G  by the deﬁnition
R
(i)
g,h    U(i)(g)   U(i)(h)
for all g,h   G . Based on these relations, we are able to introduce a global utility
(or comparison) relation C : N  G  G  as follows: For all i   N and g,h   G 
we deﬁne Ci, g,h  if and only if R
(i)
g,h. If the set N is ﬁnite and enumerated, i.e.,
N = {i1,...,in}, then this leads to the list R(i1),...,R(in) of utility relations
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After these preparations, now we consider the dominance relationship. Com-
bining its predicate logic deﬁnition in (1) with the relations M and C, we get
g   h    ( i : Mi,g   Ci, g,h )   ( i : Mi,g   Ci, h,g ) (14)
for all g,h   G . Now, we use the exchange relation E : G  G   G  G  and
transform the expression Ci, h,g  of (14) as follows:
Ci, h,g       a,b  : Ci, a,b     a,b  =  h,g 
     a,b  : Ci, a,b    E a,b , g,h 
   (C;E)i, g,h  .
This equivalence yields the following description of dominance:
g   h    ( i : Mi,g   Ci, g,h )   ( i : Mi,g   (C;E)i, g,h ). (15)
The use of pairs  g,h  and the quantiﬁed i in the right-hand side of (15) suggests
to specify the dominance relationship as a vector dominance(M,C):G  G   1
which describes the set of pairs u   G    G  such that the ﬁrst component
dominates the second component. In the proof of the next theorem we show how
to obtain from (15) a relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of this vector.
Theorem 4.2 Let   : G  G   G  and   : G  G   G  be the projection
relations and E : G  G   G  G  the exchange relation. If we deﬁne
dominance(M,C)=( ;MT   C
T
);L   ( ;MT   E;C
T
);L, (16)
then we have for all u =  g,h  G   G  that dominance(M,C)u if and only if
g   h.
Proof: We start our calculation with the ﬁrst conjunct of the right-hand side
of (15) and transform it as follows:
 i : Mi,g   Ci, g,h     ¬ i : Mi,g   Ci, g,h 
   ¬ i : MT
g,i   Ci,u
   ¬ i :(  g  :  u,g    MT
g ,i)   C
T
u,i
   ¬ i :(  ;MT)u,i   C
T
u,i
   ¬ i :(  ;MT   C
T
)u,i   Li L : N  1
   (( ;MT   C
T
);L)u .
In a similar way we treat the second conjunct of the right-hand side of (15). Here
we can proceed as follows:
 i : Mi,g   (C;E)i, g,h      i :(  ;MT)u,i   (C;E)i, g,h  see above
    i :(  ;MT)u,i   (C;E)
T
u,i   Li L : N  1
    i :(  ;MT)u,i   (E;C
T
)u,i   Li E = ET
    i :(  ;MT   E;C
T
)u,i   Li
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Combining these derivations with the deﬁnition (16) of dominance(M,C) and
property (15) yields the desired result.  
During the proof of Theorem 4.2 we have applied the symmetry of the exchange
relation E to make a later RelView-implementation of dominance(M,C) more
e cient. Symmetry of E is an immediate consequence of its element-wise descrip-
tion. But it also can be shown with the help of the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation
(3) of E and a relation-algebraic axiomatization of the projection relations as,
e.g., presented in Schmidt et al. [13].
If one is interested in the dominance relationship between feasible govern-
ments as a relation of type [G   G ] instead of a vector as we described it, then
such a relation can be obtained using that rel(v)= T;(    (v;L)) describes
a vector v : X Y  1 as relation rel(v):X  Y , i.e., v x,y  and rel(v)x,y are
equivalent for all x   X and y   Y (where  ,  are the projection relations; see
again Schmidt et al. [13]).
4.3 Stability
Finally, we consider stability of feasible governments. Here we start with a sta-
bility vector stable(M,C):G   1 which describes the subset SG
  of G , i.e.,
the subset of all (feasible) stable governments. From the deﬁnition of SG
  in
Section 2 and Theorem 4.2 we get
stable(M,C)g    ¬ h : dominance(M,C) h,g  (17)
for all g   G . This description immediately yields a relation-algebraic speciﬁ-
cation of stability.
Theorem 4.3 Let   : G  G   G  be the second projection relation of the
Cartesian product G    G . Then
stable(M,C)= T;dominance(M,C). (18)
Proof: For all g   G  we have
stable(M,C)g    ¬ h : dominance(M,C) h,g  (17)
   ¬ u :  u,g   dominance(M,C)u
   ¬ u :  T
g,u   dominance(M,C)u
   ( T;dominance(M,C))g
and, hence, (18) is a consequence of the equality of relations.  
5 Implementation and Example
In order to illustrate our approach, in the following we use the RelView tool to
solve a simple theoretical example based on the real structure of the Polish gov-
ernment after the 2001 elections. The extended version of this example, without
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5.1 The RelView Tool
Relational algebra has a ﬁxed and surprisingly small set of constants and op-
erations which – in the case of ﬁnite carrier sets – can be implemented very
e ciently. At Kiel University we have developed a visual computer system for
the visualization and manipulation of relations and for relational prototyping
and programming, called RelView. The tool is written in the C programming
language, uses reduced ordered binary decision diagrams for implementing rela-
tions, and makes full use of the X-windows graphical user interface. Details and
applications can be found, for instance, in Berghammer et al. [3], Behnke et al.
[1], Berghammer et al. [4], and Berghammer et al. [5].
The main purpose of the RelView tool is the evaluation of relation-algebraic
expressions. These are constructed from the relations of its workspace using pre-
deﬁned operations and tests, user-deﬁned relational functions, and user-deﬁned
relational programs. A relational program is much like a function procedure in
the programming languages Pascal or Modula 2, except that it only uses relations
as data type. It starts with a head line containing the program name and the
list of formal parameters, which stand for relations. Then the declaration of the
local relational domains, functions, and variables follows. Domain declarations
can be used to introduce projection relations and pairings of relations in the
case of Cartesian products, and injection relations and sums of relations in the
case of disjoint unions, respectively. The third part of a program is the body,
a while-program over relations. As a program computes a value, ﬁnally, its last
part consists of a return-clause, which is a relation-algebraic expression whose
value after the execution of the body is the result.
For example, the relation-algebraic speciﬁcation dominance(M,C) of the vec-
tor describing the dominance relationship between feasible governments imme-
diately leads to the following RelView-program.
dominance(M,C)
DECL Prod = PROD(M^*M,M^*M);
pi, rho, E
BEG pi = p-1(Prod);
rho = p-2(Prod);
E = [rho,pi]
RETURN -dom(pi*M^ & -C^) & dom(pi*M^ & E*-C^)
END.
In this program the ﬁrst declaration introduces Prod as a name for the direct
product G  G . Using Prod, the projection relations and the exchange relation
are then computed by the three assignments of the body and stored as pi, rho,
and E, respectively. The return-clause of the program consists of a direct transla-
tion of (16) into RelView-notation, where ^, -, &, and * denote transposition,
complement, intersection, and composition, and, furthermore, the pre-deﬁned
operation dom computes for a relation R : X  Y the vector R;L : X  1.
Also a translation of the remaining relation-algebraic speciﬁcations of Section
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5.2 The Example
In order to illustrate the application of RelView to coalition formation, we
use a theoretical example presented in Rusinowska et al. [11]. It is based on
the structure of Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections. The Lower House of
Polish Parliament after these elections consists of seven parties: the Alliance of
the Democratic Left and Labor Union (SLD), Civil Platform (PO), Self-Defence,
Law and Justice (PiS), Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Polish Family Alliance, and
German Minority.
In our example, the acceptability relationships showed that 17 governments
are feasible. Only four of the seven parties are involved in these feasible govern-
ments, viz. SLD, PO, PiS, and PSL. The following picture shows the membership
relation M as Boolean 4   17 matrix as presented by RelView. Here a black
square means 1 and a white square means 0 so that, for example, the ﬁrst gov-






























Based on the parties’ preferences, in Rusinowska et al. [11] the following
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912 Relations, RelView and Coalition Formation
With the help of the data presented in this table we can deﬁne the utility relations
R(i), where i  {SLD, PO, PiS, PSL}. To give an impression how these relations
look as RelView-matrices, the next two pictures show the matrices for R(SLD)





















































































An easy way to obtain these relations is, ﬁrst to draw – from the table above –
the directed graphs expressing the immediate neighborhood relationships of the
utilities, and then to compute the reﬂexive-transitive closures of the graphs’ re-

































At this place we would like to point out that theoretically it is not necessary
that the utilities of all governments to the parties are available as real numbers.
As the two pictures show, it would su ce to have the relationships at hand which
are expressed by the di erent horizontal layers of the graphs of the relations
R(i) and, e.g., obtained by a ﬁnite and linearly ordered set of utilities. But the
techniques and systems used in practice (e.g., MacBeth in Roubens et al. [10])
usually assume numerical values for all utilities.
Having deﬁned the membership relation and the utility (or comparison) re-








































9Relations, RelView and Coalition Formation 13
and, after that, the vector describing the set of stable governments. The out-
put of our example, i.e., the vector showing all stable governments, is presented
in the following picture. To save place, it shows the vector stable(M,C) in the


























According to this Boolean row vector, 3 out of 17 feasible governments are
stable: governments g12, g16 and g17. We like to point out that it took only
0.04 second for RelView to determine these stable governments on a Sun-Fire
880 workstation (running Solaris 9 at 750 MHz).
To test the e ciency of our RelView-programs, we have performed further
experiments with randomly generated larger examples, e.g., 20 parties and 400
feasible governments. In each case it took at most some seconds to compute all
stable governments – although 400 feasible governments lead to a C-matrix with
160000 columns.
If there are (as in the Polish elections example) only a small number of feasible
governments, then a RelView-user immediately obtains the stable governments
from their vector description or, as an alternative, by ﬁrst computing dominance
as a relation on G    G  as sketched in Section 4.2 (applying the operation rel
to the vector dominance(M,C)) and looking after that for the sources (roots)
of the graph-representation of this relation. In the latter case, things become
even more easy if one considers only the graph of the immediate neighborhood
relationships of the dominance relation, that is, a so-called transitive reduction.
For the Polish government example, we obtain the following picture (drawn with
RelView using the layout algorithm of Gansner et al. [8]), showing again that
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In the case of a large number of feasible governments, say 400 as mentioned
above, stability hardly can be seen from the vector or the graph description.
Nevertheless, there is a very understandable RelView-visualization of the set
of all stable governments, viz. as the columns of a relation of type [M  SG
 ].











The general method to obtain such a column-wise description of stable gov-
ernments is to compute the composition M;id
T, where M : N  G  is the
relation describing government membership and id : SG
   G  is the represen-
tation of the identical function from SG
  to G  as a relation. The computation
of id with the RelView tool is very easy (and fast), since this relation corre-
sponds to the so-called injective mapping generated by the vector stable(M,C)
and RelView possesses a corresponding pre-deﬁned operation inj for comput-
ing such mappings from vectors. A formal relation-algebraic speciﬁcation of this
operation, e.g., can be found in Berghammer et al. [2].
6 Conclusion
We formulated the notions of feasibility, dominance, and stability for govern-
ments in relation-algebraic terms. This enables us to use the RelView tool to
compute which governments are stable. Such an application is important if one
wants to apply the coalition formation model of Rusinowska et al. [12] to real
life situations. We illustrated the use of RelView by a simpliﬁed version of the
formation of a government in Poland after the 2001 elections.
We feel that our approach has some advantages. First of all, the formality of
relational algebra drastically reduces the danger of making errors. As our exam-
ples (and many others) show, it is often possible to ‘calculate’ concise relational
algorithms from formal mathematical speciﬁcations, so that correctness is guar-
anteed by construction. Secondly, the application of RelView not only allows a
relational algorithm to be executed after its simple translation into the system’s
programming language. RelView also can be used to visualize its results and
to animate its mode of operation. Besides its e ciency (which follows from the
fact that the underlying technology is based on ROBDDs), we believe that the
real attraction of the tool is its ﬂexibility and the shortness and clearness of its
programs (a consequence of relational algebra). New relation-based concepts are
introduced all the time – in decision theory as well as in other disciplines – and
experience has taught us that RelView is an ideal tool for experimenting and
playing with them while avoiding unnecessary overhead. This is demonstrated
by many other examples, including also game-theoretic ones (like the computa-
tion of all kernels and winning positions if a two-player game is described by a
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For the future we plan to develop relation-algebraic formulations of bargain-
ing procedures, in order to be able to select a speciﬁc stable government if more
than one stable government exists. We are also interested in applications of re-
lational algebra and the RelView tool to other problems of decision theory, for
instance choices in social groups where the decision of group members can be
inﬂuenced by other ones.
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